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NOTE
FLAG DESECRATION - THE UNSETTLED ISSUE
Dennis M. Tushla
I. Introduction
Robert Fleming is a former.associate dean of the Buffalo University Law
School and is presently the university's advocate. On May 30, 1970, he was
arrested and charged with desecrating the American flag by "flying [it] over
his home with a white peace symbol instead of a field of stars in the upper left-
hand corner." Mr. Fleming commented: "I think that this was within the
constitutional limits of free speech. I've defended people charged this way
before and won, so I'm not worried. But I didn't expect this to happen."'
Seventeen-year-old Bruce Parker of Charlotte, North Carolina, may not
have expected it to happen either when he was ordered to pay court costs of
fifteen dollars after a conviction on a similar charge; "wearing on his jacket
an American flag with the written words, 'Give peace a chance' and a peace
symbol."2
In April, 1969, John Bryant, a fifty-four-year-old World War II Army
Air Force veteran from Indianapolis, was fined $500 and sentenced to 180
days in jail "for desecrating an American flag by using it as a laundry bag,
pillow and suit case."'
A flag was burned on the front steps of a United States courthouse on
November 14, 1968. FBI agents arrested Norma Ferguson and John Kangas
and charged them with violating the federal flag desecration statute. In convict-
ing the defendants, the court ruled that it could not "accept the view that the
actions charged can be labeled 'speech' merely because [the] defendant intends
thereby to express an idea."'
One student and a former student at the University of Hawaii were
charged with flag desecration for having represented the flag on a poster with
dollar signs in place of stars. The student, Noel Kent, appealed from his con-
viction and the Hawaii Circuit Court reversed, holding that no dishonor had
been slown toward the flag by this act.5
Fortunately for sixteen-year-old Rod Taylor of Colorado Springs, District
Court Judge John Gallagher ordered him reinstated in his high school after he
was expelled "because he destroyed an American Flag during speech class."'
From New York to Hawaii, the headlines are dear: the flag of the United
1 New York Times, May 31, 1970, at 47, col. 4.
2 Id., May 10, 1970, at 59, col. 1.
3 Id., Apr. 9, 1969, at 4, col. 8.
4 United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
5 State v. Kent, Hawaii 1st Cir. Ct., No. 36, 423, Dec. 9, 1966; reprinted in Hearings
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the judiciary on H.R. 271 and Similar Pro-
posals to Prohibit Desecration of the Flag, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 4, at 175-77 "(1967).
6 New York Times, Apr. 11, 1970, at 32, col. 3.
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States has become the symbol of legal controversy. As if to challenge the laws of
the states and the federal government, Americans, in one form or another,
"publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon or cast contempt either
by word or act, upon [the United States flag]"' and are thereby prosecuted in
such numbers that the trend has been called by at least one professor of law
"the phenomenon of flag desecration."'
If the abundance of prosecutions for abusing the flag is phenomenal, the
variety of forms in which the flag is depicted is unmatched in our national his-
tory. Americans have, in fact, confused themselves as to exactly what the flag
symbolizes and as to the meaning that the emblem is intended to convey.'
The confusion originates, not unexpectedly, in the heart of the legal process
throughout the country. Vague laws, inconsistent prosecutions and extreme dis-
parities in penalties among the various states have created a legal morass from
statutory standards which have remained, until recently, largely unchallenged.
Of the questions which arise from these cases and statutes, the most com-
pelling is whether the use of the flag as a means of conveying a message symbol-
ically is protected under the first amendment guarantee of free speech, and in
particular, whether any such use of the flag may be considered "symbolic
speech."" The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged this issue more
than once, but has left it unanswered. 2 This Note will examine the general
background of the problem, as well as some of the arguments and related cases
in terms of a foreseeable settlement of this unsettled issue.
II. General Background
Although the American flag was officially created on June 14, 1777,"s
it was not until 140 years later that any legislative protection for the flag was
approved. The initial guardian against desecration came in the form of the
Uniform Flag Act which was adopted by the states of Arizona, Louisiana,
7 The Wording is that of the typical state statute. See notes 23-27 infra.
8 Prosser, Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. L.F. 159, 160 (1969).
9 T ME, June 6, 1970, at 8-15. See id. at 9-12 for color photographs.
10 Some examples illustrate these inconsistencies. Police in Bridgeport, Connecticut, are
authorized to wear an American flag patch on their uniform if they so desire. New York Times,
Jan. 12, 1970, at 34, col. 7. New York Patrolman Patrick Dolan received a congratulatory
letter from President Nixon for having succeeded in amending police uniform regulations to
allow the wearing of a flag pin no larger than a square inch. Id., Jan. 28, 1970, at 44, col. 4.
The flag pin is now a voluntary part of the uniform of Boston police. Id., Feb. 2, 1970, at 70,
col. 2.
On the other hand, Allan Smith of Hinsdale, New York, was charged with "contemptuous
display of the American flag," for driving a car which had red and white stripes painted on the
sides and a star-spangled hood. Id., Jan. 31, 1970, at 13, col. 5. A Rutgers University student
was arrested during a protest demonstration "on charges of having desecrated the American
flag by wearing it over his shoulders." Id., Apr. 16, 1970, at 48, col. 4. Eighteen-year-old
William Chambers was fined $100 and sentenced to thirty days in jail for admittedly appearing
in public at Waterloo, New York, wearing trousers fashioned from a flag; he was also ordered
to raise and lower the flag each day of his jail term. Id., May 20, 1970, at 63, col. 2. There
was neither public criticism nor arrest of celebrities, Roy Rogers and Dale Evans, after they
appeared on a January 24, 1970, television production of "Hollywood Palace," wearing "cos-
tumes making use of the stars and stripes associated with the flag," with the intended effect of
using the flag "as a symbol to suggest patriotism." Id., Mar. 3, 1970, at 65, col. 1.
11 Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 CoLUm. L. Rav. 1091 (1968).
12 See notes 81 and 89 infra.
13 Prossei, supra note 8, at 194.
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Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and
Wisconsin. 14 Politicians during the election of 1896 had seized upon the flag
as a means of identifying their party with some higher symbol in the voter's
mind. The idea, however, fell into the hands of both major parties and the
flag suddenly became the ubiquitous prop of political exploitation. According
to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, flag desecration accompanied the
emotionalism of the times, when
... the flag so used was torn down and torn in pieces and trampled
in the dust. These outrages occurred in all sections of the country. This
demonstrated that there was lurking among the people a spirit in political
excitement in which was lacking a decent respect and reverence for our
National emblem2 5
Indeed, many of the incidents occurring at that time make the dishonor
brought to the flag today seem mild by comparison.' Exploitation of the flag,
however, was not limited to politics alone. At the beginning of the century, a
wide variety of commercial products was being promoted through advertise-
ments depicting the American flag - another form of desecration.'
The efforts of the American Flag Association, combined with public de-
mand, produced flag legislation in more than half of the states by the year
1907." In 1907, the Supreme Court addressed itself to the problem of com-
mercial exploitation of the flag in Halter v. Nebraska.' The Court upheld a
state's conviction of two men who sold beer depicting the American flag on the
label. The first test of the constitutionality of flag legislation was thus met, and
the decision became primary authority regarding a state's interest in fostering
respect for the flag.2" The Halter case has, however, been discredited to some
extent concerning the issue of freedom of expression and the use of the flag by
14 9B UNIFORm LAws ANNOTATED 48 (1966).
15 Id.
16 As Professor Prosser notes:
During the campaign, paper flags bearing pictures of the political candidates were
posted in courtrooms in Anderson, Indiana. They were tom down and trampled.
In Council Bluffs, Iowa, a large American flag with a partisan banner was fired
upon with a shotgun. A soldier returned the fire, killing the assailant's horse. At
Sedalia, Missouri, a child with a flag in her hand was singing campaign songs on the
platform of a special train. A man seized the girl's flag and burned it, to the applause
of some members of the crowd. Prosser, suprz note 8, at 196.
17 Some of the examples cited by the American Flag Association include:
... bicycles, bock beer, whiskey, fine cambric, Bone Knoll sour mash, tar soap,
American pepsin chewing gum, theatres, tobacco, Japan tea, awnings, breweries,
cigars, charity balls, cuff buttons, dime museums, door mats, fireworks,' furriers, living
pictures, picnic grounds, patent medicines, pool rooms, prize fights, restaurants,
roof gardens, realestate [sic] agencies, sample rooms, shoe stores, soap makers, saloons,
shooting galleries, tentmakers, variety shows, venders [sic] of lemon acid, and for
awnings and a host of others. S. REP. No. 506, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1904).
18 Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 39 n.1 '(1907).
19 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
20 Justice John Marshall Harlan spoke for the majority:
As the statute in question evidently had its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feel-
ing of patriotism among the people of Nebraska, we are unwilling to adjudge that in
legislation for that purpose the State erred in duty or has infringed the constitutional
right of anyone. On the contrary, it may reasonably be affirmed that a diuty rests
upon each State in every legal way to encourage its people to love the Union with
which the State is indissolubly connected. Id. at 43.
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a New York district court which pointed out that Halter was decided before the
first amendment was applicable to the states under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.21
All fifty states currently have statutes aimed at proscribing certain conduct
in association with the American flag. The most notable distinctions between
the various statutes are (1) the maximum penalty and (2) the particular lan-
guage of some statutes 2
A comparison of the statutes reveals that the penalty varies from a mere
$20-$100 fine in Oregon, to a $3000 fine and a maximum of three years im-
prisonment in Oklahoma. Nine states recommend no specific penalty, and
describe the violation upon conviction as only some form of misdemeanor.
23
Nine states have amended the maximum penalty to higher fines and longer
sentences.2 4 The statutes of seven states are entitled and patterned after the
Uniform Flag Act. 2 While nearly all states regard the violation of their flag
desecration statutes a misdemeanor, three states consider burning or other
mutilation of the flag to be a felony.26 Furthermore, there are serious dis-
crepancies in the various statutes regarding the elements of knowledge or intent.
Only eleven states require that the conduct of the defendant be wilful, deliberate
or knowing."
Ironically, Congress was not attempting to alleviate this lack of uniformity
in the state laws when it passed the federal flag desecration law in 1967.8 That
law specifically states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession, or the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico of jurisdiction over any offense over which it
would have jurisdiction in the absence of this section.
29
21 Duncombe v. New York, 267 F. Supp. 103, 106 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). The pertinent
portion of the opinion reads:
I adhere to the view . . . that the substantive constitutional issues are not insub-
stantial. This view can scarcely be altered by Halter which was decided several years
before the protections of the First Amendment were held to be firmly applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the argument that the
statute is unconstitutional for vagueness - which is one of Duncombe's major
contentions - was notably absent in the Halter case.
22 See Appendix.
23 California, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Virginia and
Washington. See Appendix.
24 Alabama: from 30 days and/or $100, to 1 year and/or $1000. Illinois: from 30 days
and/or $10-$100, to 1-5 years and/or $1000-$5000. Minnesota: from 90 days and/or $100, to
90 days and/or $300. New Hampshire: from 30 days and/or $50, to 6 months and/or $1000.
Ohio: from 30 days and/or $100, to 30 days-1 year and/or $100-$1000. Oklahoma: from 30
days and/or $100, to 3 years and/or $3000. Pennsylvania: from 6 months and/or $200, to
1 year and/or $1000. Tennessee: from 60 days and/or $200, to 1-3 years and/or $500-$1000.
Wisconsin: from 3 months and/or $100, to 1 year and/or $500. See Appendix.
25 Delaware, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. See Appendix.
26 Alabama, Oklahoma and Tennessee. See Appendix.
27 Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming are the only states which include "wilful," "deliberate,"
"intentional," or "knowing" desecration in the wording of their respective statutes. See Appen-
dix. This point was debated at some length in the House of Representatives upon considera-
tion of the federal flag desecration law. 113 CoNo. REc. 16,453, 16,464 (daily ed. June 20,
1967).
28 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968).
29 Id. § 700(c). The other subsections are as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the United States by
[Fall, 1970]
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Rather than attempting to bring the public consciousness toward a common
understanding of specific conduct proscribed, Congress passed the bill on
June 20, 1967, with debate and emotional oratory filling over fifty pages in
the Congressional Record. 0 The remarks of Representative Ryan of New York
reveal provocative insights into the possible ramifications of the law:
How ironic it is to undermine the symbol of our individual liberty in the
zeal to enforce reverence for that symbol.
Mr. Chairman, no nation has ever saved itself by imposing ever harsher
penalties upon its dissenters, and no democracy should ever wish to do so.
Mr. Chairman, there is a serious constitutional issue involved in this
legislation - the question of whether or not symbolic action may be pro-
tected under the first amendment guarantee of free speech 31
III. Some Arguments and Related Cases
The burden necessarily shifted to the courts to interpret and rule on legisla-
tion aimed at protecting the flag. One of the first applications of the new
federal law came on October 3, 1968, when Abbie Hoffman appeared in
Washington, D.C., to testify before the House of Representatives' Committee on
Un-American Activities wearing a "shirt that resembled the American flag." 2
In affirming Hoffman's subsequent conviction, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of the new law.
publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined not
more than $1000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
(b) The term "flag of the United States" as used in this section, shall include any
flag, standard, colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of either, or of any
part or parts of either, made of any substance or represented on any substance,. of
any size evidently purporting to be either of said flag, standard, colors, or ensign
of the United States of America, or a picture or a representation of either, upon
which shall be shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any number of either
thereof, or of any part or parts of either, by which the average person seeing the
same without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag, standards,
colors, or ensign of the Unites States of America.
30 113 CoNG. REc. 16,441-99 (daily ed. June 20, 1967).
31 Id. at 16,472. The bill passed the House by a vote of 387-16. Id. at 16,498.
The Attorney General of the United States, Ramsey Clark, addressed a letter to Chairman
James 0. Eastland of the Senate Judiciary Committee, when that body -was considering the
bill, in which he stated:
Particular care should be exercised to avoid infringement of free speech. To make
it a crime if one "defies" or "casts contempt . . . either by word or act" upon the
national flag is to risk invalidation. Such language reaches toward conduct which
may be protected by First Amendment guarantees. The courts have been insistent
on guarding against sanctions which reach the protected expression of ideas and also
have struck down on grounds of vagueness provisions which are so broad that they
might include protected speech along with conduct that could constitutionally be
penalized. U.S. CoDu CoNG. AND ADmIN. NEws 2507, 2511 (1968).
32 Hoffman v. United States, 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The opinion of the Court
of Appeals is worth noting:
Appellant's contention that the Statute [18 U.S.C. § 700) as applied abridges his free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment appears to be his chief conten-
tion oh this appeal. He argues that his conduct was "symbolic speech" and that no
distinction should be made between symbolic and n6nsymbolic communication of
ideas. We disagree. The First Amendment protects freedom of speech and not free-
dom of conduct. Id. at 568.
The Court apparently rejected the concepts established by the United States Supreme




Surely the Government has a substantial, genuine and important interest
in protecting the flag from public desecration by contemptuous conduct.
We find the Statute to be a reasonable regulation limited to prohibiting
certain defined acts of conduct, and it does not necessarily impinge on a
citizen's right to protest.
33
The argument that the government (federal or state) has an interest in
protecting the flag from abuse is undisputed?4 Indeed, a recent federal case
in Delaware, 5 which held that state's flag desecration statute to be unconsti-
tutionally vague, declared: "That the state has an interest in the preservation
of the national symbol is not disputed. Nor is it questionable that the interest
permits some types of regulation, to the detriment of asserted freedoms."3
In that case, the defendant had been arrested and charged under the Delaware
law"7 for expressing his dissatisfaction with United States war policy in Vietnam
by displaying the United Nations flag in the position of honor on the right side
of his house front and the United States' flag at half mast in the subordinate
position on the left side. The court reasoned that "[I]f there are limitations on
the protection afforded conduct by the First Amendment, they are defined by
exigencies other than the prevention of public expression of attitudes - even
those of defiance or contempt."3 "
The court in United States v. Ferguson" would seem to set the limitation
at the point of "contemptuous destruction" of the flag, regardless of the pro-
tection given to "symbolic speech, due to the availability of other means of com-
munication."" The line which separates "contemptuous destruction" from pro-
tected symbolic speech, however, is surely tenuous in the courts today.4' The
fundamental questions that must be considered are: (1) what is meant by
33 Id. at 569. While the Hoffman case is pending further appeal, the controversy over the
appellant's flag shirt has accelerated under different circumstances. In March, 1970, Hoff-
man appeared as a guest on an entertainment program broadcast over the Columbia Broad-
casting System wearing a flag shirt beneath a heavier outer coat. Public outrage with CBS
reached great proportions after the network "blacked out" the screen, preventing viewers from
seeing the shirt. CBS explained that it feared legal complications would have resulted from
allowing Hoffman to exhibit the flag shirt. New York Times, Mar. 28, 1970, at 29, col. 8.
34 Halter v. Nebraska, supra note 18.
35 Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
36 Id. at 534.
37 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 532 (1968). This statute is patterned after the Uniform Flag
Law and imposes a maximum penalty of $100 or 30 days imprisonment or both.
38 310 F. Supp. at 534.
39 United States v. Ferguson, supra note 4.
40 Id. at 1114. The relevant statements of the court include the following:
The power to select a flag carries with it the power to do whatever is necessary
and proper for carrying into effect this selection. Certainly this would include the
power to protect it from contemptuous destruction ...
[E]ven if the burning of the flag was accepted as speech, prohibition of this act
would deprive the speaker of no audience or of no other means of reaching her
audience.
41 The facts in Joyce v. United States, 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1969) present a dubious
picture of an appellant who ". . . knowingly cast contempt upon the flag by publicly mutilat-
ing it." On Inauguration Day, 1969, in Washington, D.C., the appellant Joyce
was holding a small American flag approximately 4 inches wide, 6 inches long and
attached to a 7-inch wooden post.
He took the flag off the post, tore it, then folded it lengthwise and, with the
assistance of one of his friends, tied it to his right index finger and raised his hand
with the index and middle finger in a V position and waved it back and forth above
his head until the flag became loose, whereupon he tightened it with his teeth and
continued to display the V sign.
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"symbolic speech" and (2) to what extent has the common law afforded con-
stitutional protection for this form of speech.
The first case in which the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment
to protect symbolic expression was Stromberg v. California."2 This case not
only held the ceremonious display of a red flag to be constitutionally protected
speech, but it also declared the extent to which such protection-is provided:
The right [of free speech] is not an absolute one, and the State in the
exercise of its police power may punish the abuse of this freedom. There
is no question but that the State may thus provide for the punishment of
those who indulge in utterances which incite to violence and crime and
threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means.43
In other cases, the Court has ruled that the same protection extended to a
sit-in demonstration." The refusal to leave a public library became another
form of protected symbolic expression, 5 as did a peaceful and orderly proces-
sion of protesters through the city of Chicago,"0 picketing," motion pictures,4"
the refusal to salute the United States flag,4" and the wearing of black arm-
bands."0
The latter two cases are particularly significant. Board of Education v.
Barnette held that the state cannot constitutionally compel anyone to salute
the flag.5 The salute is the accepted manifestation of respect for that which
is symbolized by the flag. Barnete stresses the notion that efforts to legislate
respect for any symbol are an exercise in futility and wholly inconsistent with
constitutional liberties. The question is therefore presented: if the state cannot
dictate that its citizens perform any outward show of respect for the flag, can
the state through the application of flag desecration laws constitutionally prohibit
acts of disrespect toward the flag? If Barnette provides an answer to this query,
it is that any act which expresses an opinion and which does not threaten a "clear
42 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The statute involved in this case was declared unconstitutional
based upon a clause which prohibited the display of any "flag, badge, banner ... or any color
... as a sign, symbol or embl6m of opposition to organized government...." Id. at 361.
43 Id. at 368-69.
44 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 '(1961). In reversing the conviction of defendants
who participated in a peaceful sit-in demonstration to protest segregation, the Court stated:
Such a demonstration .. . is as much a part of the "free trade in ideas" as is
verbal expression, more commonly thought of as "speech." It, like speech, appeals
to good sense and to "the power of reason as applied through public discussion!' just
as much as, if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street
corner. Id. at 201.
This same form of symbolic expression was reaffirmed as being protected in Bell v. Mary-
land, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
45 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
46 Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
47 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See also, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S.
106 (1940).
48 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
49 Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
50 Tinker v. Independent Comihunity School District, 393 U.S. 503 '(1969).
51 The Court in Barnette observed:
There is no doubt that . . .the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag
to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to
mind.... A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it. and what is
one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn. 319 U.S. at 632-33.
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and present danger" to the community peace and welfare cannot be legally
suppressed." On this point, the Court emphasizes that the scope of such pro-
tected expression is necessarily substantial.
. . . freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.5 '
Twenty-six years after Barnette, the Court decided Tinker v. Independent
Community School District.
In order for the State . . . to justify prohibition of a particular ex-
pression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.5 4
The conduct of the appellants in this case - wearing of black armbands
was intended as a symbolic expression of protest against United States policy
in Vietnam, and was held to be neither actually nor potentially disruptive.
The Court held this conduct to be "... . closely akin to 'pure speech' which . . .
is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment."",
The limitations placed on "pure speech" provide some insight and guidance
as to the meaning of "symbolic speech" and its restrictions. Such expressions as
include
* . . the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting words' - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace . . . are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
52 The Court in Barnette further stated:
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion
is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present
danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. Id. at 633.
This rule was asserted originally in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It was
modified in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), wherein the Court adopted the
judicial balancing test established by Judge Learned Hand: "In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510.
53 319 U.S. at 642. The concurring opinion of Justices Douglas and Black corroborated
the majority's statement:
Love of country must spring from willing hearts and free minds, inspired by a fair
administration of wise laws enacted by the people's elected representatives within the
bounds of express constitutional prohibitions. These laws must, to be consistent with
the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints consistent
with a society of free men. Id. at 644.
54 393 U.S. at 509.
55 Id. at 505, 506. The concurring opinion of Justice Fortas in Barker v. Hardway, 394
U.S. 905 (1969), a- case in which college students had participated in a violent protest against
their college administration, distinguished the conduct protected in Tinker from that conduct
which the state can prevent and punish:
The petitioners contend that their conduct was protected by the First Amend-
ment, but the findings of the District Court, which were accepted by the Court
of Appeals, establish that the petitioners here engaged in an aggressive and violent
demonstration, and not in peaceful, nondisruptive expression, such as was involved in




to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.58
These expressions comprise some of the restrictions on pure speech recognized
by the Court and are not protected.
This process of weighing the interests of society is perhaps the unacknowl-
edged cause for the present unsettled state of flag desecration law. Such a test
is consistently applied in cases wherein the sensitive balancing of private and
public rights is susceptible to a number of relative factors."7 In Terminiell v.
Chicago,58 for example, the defendant had been charged with disorderly conduct
for having incited resentment against a crowd gathered outside the auditorium
in which the defendant, speaking to a meeting of the Christian Veterans of
America, denounced certain political and racial groups. The Supreme Court
found that the defendant's conviction may have rested upon a jury instruction
permitting the jury to find guilt if the speech stirred people to anger, invited
public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. The conviction was
reversed by the Court, which held that such effect may be validly brought about
through the constitutional exercise of free speech.59
In a similar case, Feiner v. New York," the Court affirmed a conviction,
holding that the arrest and conviction of the petitioner was not for the utterance
or the content of his speech, but for "the reaction which it actually engendered."'"
One conclusion that may validly be asserted from these two cases is that
noticeably absent from the Court's reasoning is any attempt to establish some
guideline by which conduct might be regulated.
General guidelines must be laid down to determine when non-verbal ex-
pression or 'symbolic speech' is in fact the essence of the activity sought
to be. regulated before any meaningful balancing of public and private
interests under the first amendment is possible. 2 -
Without attempting to determine exactly what guidelines are derived from
the cases, it might be asserted that two of the most important considerations in
56 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See also, Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
57 See generally, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); American Communications
Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950); Note, Desecration of National Symbols as
Protected Political Expression, 66 Micr. L. Rav. 1040, 1043 n.16 '(1968).
58 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
59 With unusual emphasis, the Court stated:
... a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and pre-
conceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute [citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)] is nevertheless protected against censor-
ship or punishment... There is no room under our Constitution for a more restric-
tive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legis-
latures, courts, or dominant political or community groups. Id. at 4-5.
60 340 U.S. 315 (1951). The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct, inciting to
riot and making derogatory remarks about public officials. He was allegedly attempting to
incite Negroes to violence against the white race and, when requested to stop speaking, he
refused.
61 Id. at 320.
62 Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091, 1105 (1968).
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cases focusing on restricting free speech are the nature of the actor's conduct
contrasted with the potential for violence. Taking these two factors together
is helpful in understanding the distinction between Adderley v. Florida,"3 and
Brown v. Louisiana."
In Adderley, the Court affirmed the conviction of demonstrators at a
county jail who were protesting segregation and the previous arrests of other
participants in the demonstration, during which the passage of vehicles into
the jail driveway was blocked. In Brown, some students refused a request to
leave a public library as a symbolic protest against segregation policies; their
conviction was reversed. Though the conduct in either case might be questioned,
the Court found the potential for violence significantly greater in Adderley.
If the message conveyed through the actor's conduct is determined to have
some "redeeming social importance," then the interest in preserving free ex-
pression is less likely to be subordinated to any other interest.6" This is true
although the symbolic message conveyed might be unpopular, especially with
respect to political protest." The principal concern in the area of flag desecra-
tion is the effect of the two relevant factors - the nature of the conduct and
the potential for violence-upon the balancing of interests, which are preserva-
tion of freedom of expression and protection of the flag from abuse or desecration.
Two New York cases, People v. Street,"r and People v. Radich," provide excel-
lent illustrations of the main issue.
As a means of protesting the shooting of civil rights leader James Meredith
in Mississippi, Sidney Street burned an American flag on a Brooklyn street
comer and declared, "We don't need no damn flag," and "If they let that
happen to Meredith, we don't need an American flag." He was charged with
publicly mutilating the United States flag.69 In unanimously affirming the
conviction, the New York Court of Appeals held that the conduct of the de-
fendant in burning the flag, was "an act of incitement, literally and figuratively
'incendiary' and as fraught with danger to the public peace as if he had stood on
the street corner shouting epithets at passing pedestrians."" ° Speaking for the
court, Chief Judge Fuld stated that the statute was designed to prevent a breach
63 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
64 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
65 The language is taken from the opinion of Justice Brennan in ruling on an obscenity
case:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion -
have the full protection of the guaranties [of free speech and press], unless exclud-
able because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests. Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). (Footnote omitted.)
66 Bacheller v. Maryland, 3 Md. App. 626, 240 A.2d 623 (1968). See also Henry v. Rock
Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Taylor v. Missis-
sippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
67 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 394
U.S. 576, 579 (1969).
68 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970).
69 NEw YORK PENAL LAW, § 1425(16) (d) (McKinney 1944); now changed to NEw
YORK GEN. Bus. LAw § 136 (McKinney 1968).
70 20 N.Y.2d 231, 237, 229 N.E.2d 187, 191, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491, 496 (1967).
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of the peace, and that the state could "legitimately curb such activities in the
interest of preventing violence and maintaining public order."'"
Steven Radich, the owner of an art gallery in Manhattan in which several
"artistic constructions" depicting 'the American flag in various forms 2 were
displayed, was convicted under the New York statute for making contemptuous
use of the flag. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a 5-2 decision.
Speaking for the majority, Judge Gibson held that the requirement of United
States v. O'Brien,"5 that a government regulation to be justified must be un-
related to the suppression of free expression, was satisfied in the conviction of
Radich. Judge Gibson relied on the opinion of Chief Judge Fuld in the Street
case.
7 4
It is significant irony that the Chief Judge emphatically dissented in
Radich. Noting that the constructions were established as works of "protest art,"
the Chief Judge stated that nothing in the Street opinion suggested that "the
mere fact that a person chooses to express himself by other than verbal means
removes him entirely from the protections of the First Amendment."'7 5 The
dissent made clear its judgment that
[i]n the absence of a showing that the public health, safety or the well
being of the community is threatened, the State may not act to suppress
symbolic speech or conduct having a clear communicative aspect, no
matter how obnoxious it may be to the prevailing views of the majority.76
According to Chief Judge Fuld, the fundamental difference between Street and
Radich was that the burning of the flag in the former posed a significant threat
to the community peace, whereas the display of the flag through the medium
of sculpture "in the quiet surroundings" of the art gallery posed no such
threat."7 The interplay of conduct (burning the flag as against displaying it
71 Id.
72 Seven forms were represented, two of which included a stuffed flag resembling a phallic
symbol protruding from the upright member of a cross, and a stuffed flag resembling a human
figure hanging from a yellow noose. The purpose behind the display was to symbolically pro-
test the "church-condoned American aggressive warfare in Vietnam," 53 Misc.2d 717, 719,
279 N.Y.S.2d 680, 683 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967). See LIFE, Mar. 31. 1967, at 18; New
York Times, Dec. 30, 1966, at 2, col. 2.
73 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
74 Judge Gibson went so far as to synopsize Chief Judge Fuld's opinion in Street as
follows:
While nonverbal expression may be a form of speech within the protection of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the same kind of freedom is not afforded to those
who communicate ideas by conduct as to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech; that the State may legitimately proscribe many forms of conduct and no
exception is made for activities to which some would ascribe symbolic significance;
that, in sum, the cases show that the constitutional guarantee of free speech covers
the substance rather than the form of communication, but that if the substance is
being conveyed by a form violative of the public health, safety or well being, then
the First Amendment protection is subordinated to the general public interest. 26
N.Y.2d 114, 116, 257 N.E.2d 30, 32 , 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49 (1970).
75 26 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 257 N.E.2d 30, 37; 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 855 (1970).
76 Id. at 124, 257 N.E.2d at 37, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
77 Chief Judge Fuld added:
In our modern age, the medium is very often the message, and the State may not
legitimately punish that which would be constitutionally protected if spoken or
drawn, simply because the idea had been expressed, instead, through the medium of
sculpture. Id. at 124, 257 N.E.2d at 38, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
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in distasteful forms) and the potential for violence (unlimited numbers at a
street comer as against voluntary observers in an art gallery) distinguished these
two cases.
The fact that the flag was "desecrated" in each case did not categorize the
convictions as deserving of the same disposition, because, as the dissent observed,
the restriction of free speech required something more than the showing of
obvious disrespect for the flag. It was necessary to establish that the private
right of the defendant to express himself without fear of suppression had been
subordinated to the public interest in preserving peace and order.7 Since this
could not be shown convincingly, the Chief Judge could only conclude: "This
prosecution ... is nothing more than political censorship falling far outside our
holding in People v. Street." 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed Street's conviction on the
ground that the statute, in proscribing the contemptuous use of the flag, "by
word or act," was unconstitutionally applied against Street since he might have
been convicted for the words he uttered rather than the act of burning the
flag. 0 To the consternation of the dissenting judges,8 ' the Court refused to
address the question of whether or not a statute proscribing the act alone could
be constitutionally upheld. 2 Hopefully this issue will soon be resolved since
the Radich case is currently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court."
IV. Necessity for an Answer
As the recent cases indicate, the dockets of courts across the country are
being filled with cases which challenge the judiciary for a clear answer to the
question set aside in Street - proving the accuracy of the Chief Justice's
admonition. "The Court's explicit reservation of the constitutionality of flag-
burning probitions encourages others to test in the streets the power of our
States and National Government to impose criminal sanctions upon those who
78 Judge Gibson did attempt to argue that a significant potential for violence could be
shown:
Here, the expression, if less dramatic, was given far wider public circulation [than
Street] and, in consequence, perhaps, a measurable enhancement of the likelihood
of incitement to disorder, by the placement of one of the constructions in a street
display window of defendant's gallery on Madison Avenue in the City of New York,
and the exhibition and exposure for sale of the companion pieces in the public gallery
and mercantile establishment within. Implicit in the invitation to view was the
opportunity thereby afforded to join in the protest, or in counterprotest, with the
consequent potential of public disorder; or so the trier of the facts could properly
find. Id. at 116, 257 N.E.2d at 32-33, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
79 Id. at 124, 257 N.E.2d at 39, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
80 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
81 Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Fortas and White dissented. In his opinion,
the Chief Justice noted emphatically:
In a time when the American flag has increasingly become an integral part of
public protests, the constitutionality of flag-desecration statutes enacted by all of the
States and Congress is a matter of the most widespread concern. Both those who
seek constitutional shelter for acts of flag desecration perpetrated in the course of
political protest and those who must enforce the law are entitled to know the scope
of constitutional protection. Id. at 604-5. (Footnotes omitted.)
82 Id. at 581, 594.
83 Radich v. New York, appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3007 '(U.S. May 18, 1970) (No.
169).
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would desecrate the flag. 8  The four dissenters in Street agreed that the de-
fendant's conduct could be constitutionally punished. However, the broader
question formulated herein - whether an individual's disrespectful use of the
flag as symbolic expression is protected by the first amendment when neither
the nature of his conduct nor the potential for violence would permit the, state
to punish such conduct in order to preserve peace and order - is an issue
which the dissent itself, left unanswered. In other words, the Court might ulti-
mately rifle that publicly burning an American flag is conduct which may con-
stitutionally be punished based on the inflammatory nature of the conduct which
lends itself to a greater potential for inciting observers to violence."5 Such a
rationale, however, might not be as easily applicable to lowering the flag to
half-mast to symbolize mourning," publicly wearing the flag as a vest,8 7 or
displaying the flag in disrespectful forms of artistic construction."5 Each of these
instances is central to a *case which has come before the Court or is in the appeal
docket."'
One of the four questions presented to the Supreme Court in the Radich
appeal deserves particular attention: "Does the statute under which [the]
appellant was convicted further any governmental interest other than fostering
respect for the flag, and is the interest Which is furthered by the statute un-
related to suppression of free speech?"9 This question is derived from the holding
in United States v. O'Brien,' wherein the defendant's conviction for burning
his draft card was affirmed.
.. . we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
84 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1969).
85 That the state may punish an individual for uttering words which incite others to com-
mit unlawful acts, and that the state may prevent an individual "from uttering words so
inflammatory that they would provoke others to retaliate physically against him, thereby
causing a breach of the peace . . ." are governmental interests recognized by Justice Harlan
which could conceivably - but not constitutionally in the circumstances of Street - be fur-
thered by punishing Street. Id. at 591.
86 Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967).
87 People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 174, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969).
88 People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970).
89 See, e.g., Radich v. New York, appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3007 (U.S. May 18,
1970) (No. 169) ; Cowgill v. California, 274 Cal. App. 174, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 '(1970); Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967),
rev'd per curiam Anderson v. Georgia, 390. U.S. 206 (1968) (the reversal was based on
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), holding Georgia's system of jury discrimination
unconstitutional).
90 Jurisdictional Statement for Defendant (filed with the United States Supreme Court)
at 3, Radich v. New York, appeal docketed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3,007 '(U.S. May 18, 1970) (No.
169). The bther three questions are as follows:
1) Does the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permit punishment of artistic
expression on the ground that it has been found to be contemptuous of our national
symbol?
2) Is the prohibition against casting contempt upon the flag in the statute under
which appellant was convicted sufficiently clear, certain and limited to meet the
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment that criminal activity be specifically
defined?
3) Does the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bar the convicti6n
of appellant for displaying sculpture in an art gallery under a statute which permits
magazine and newspaper publishers to show photographs of that sculpture in their
publications and permits exhibition of paintings on the same theme?
91 391 U.S. 367 '(1968).
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an important or substantial governmental interest; if the government in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the in-
cidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.9 2 [Emphasis added.]
The governmental interest in O'Brien was clearly identified as "limited to
preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service
System."9  The governmental interest involved in Radich was established as
preventing "acts dishonoring the flag."94 Whether this interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression can only be determined after it has been shown
that some form of expression was in fact exercised within the proper limitations
set by other govermnental interests - specifically, the interest in preserving peace
and order in the community. Whether the governmental interest in protecting
the flag outweighs the interest in preventing restriction of the freedom of ex-
pression appears to be answered by a careful consideration of the language by
which the Supreme Court has consistently and jealously guarded the latter
interest. In Abrams v. United States,95 Mr. Justice Holmes said:
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country.96
The Court in DeJonge v. Oregon97 reached a similar conclusion:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more
imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press, and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity
for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive
to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by
peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very founda-
tion of constitutional government.98
The language of Cantwell v. Connecticut99 is likewise impressive:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp dif-
ferences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest
error to his neighbor .... But the people of this nation have ordained in
the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses,
these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and
right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their shield
92 Id. at 377.
93 Id. at 382.
94 26 N.Y.2d 114, 120, 257 N.E.2d 30, 35, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 853 (1970).
95 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
96 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
98 Id. at 365.
99 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested
and unobstructed.' °0
That the theme symbolically conveyed by disrespectful uses of the flag has
been political protest, is an understatement of the current wave of cases. In
Hodsdon v. Buckson,'0 1 the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware carried the rationale of Barnette.°2 and Stromberg0 3 to the conclusion
that "the punishment of peaceful symbolic acts rejecting the political ideas be-
spoken by the flag is as alien to the mandate of the First Amendment as is
compulsion to signify adherence." ' 4 The dissenting judge in the Radich case
when it came before the New York City Criminal Court, Judge Basel, cited
the inequity of convicting the defendant.
There are many Americans in opposition to the war, who ... protest that
the image of the American flag as a symbol of freedom to lovers of liberty
and a shining object to the oppressed is cast in contempt. . . . This is
the message the artist seeks to convey in the work the defendant ex-
hibited. We may quarrel with his theme, disagree with his method, condemn
his goal. We cannot dispute his right to express dissent even though the
means be loathsome to us. 10 5
The flag desecration statute in Pennsylvania contains a clause which exempts
the application of the statute to any "patriotic or political demonstration or
decoration."'0 6  Stephen Haugh, a twenty-three-year-old Pennsylvania State
University student participated in a campus antiwar demonstration on July 4,
1967, during which he "brandished an American flag emblazoned with the
slogans 'Make Love Not War' and 'The New American Revolutionaries.' ,,1oT
The conviction of Haugh for desecrating the flag was reversed by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court which strictly construed the clause and held that the
state legislature could not define "political" to exclude protest groups. "8
Many such cases receiving publicity today involve the wearing of a flag
patch,0" or of the flag itself."0 The Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Ohio,
has construed the "otherwise cast contempt" portion of the Ohio statute which
states "No person shall . . . publicly mutilate, bum, destroy, defile, deface,
trample upon or otherwise cast contempt upon [the United States flag],"""
to mean "acts of physical destruction or abuse similar in nature to acts of
100 Id. at 310.
101 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970).
102 Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
103 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 "(1931).
104 310 F. Supp. at 535.
105 53 Misc.2d 217, 223, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680, 686 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967).
106 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4211 (1963).
107 - A.2d - (1970). See TrE, July 20, 1970, at 43.
108 Id.
109 Hoffman v. United States, 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969); New York Times, May 22,
1970, at 63, col. 2; id. May 10, 1970, at 59, col. 1; id., Apr. 15, 1970, at 74, col. 8 (flag
sewed to seat of trousers); id., Feb. 24, 1970, at 8, col. 3 (flag sewed to seat of trousers);
Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
110 Duncombe v. New York, 267 F. Supp. 103 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); New York Times, Apr.
16, 1970, at 48, col. 4; COMMONWEAL, Mar. 27, 1970, at 61 (carrying flag across shoulder).
111 Oxo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2921.05 (Anderson 1953).
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mutilating, burning, destroying, defiling, defacing, or trampling upon. ' 112 The
conviction of a defendant who was charged with having ':unlawfully, publicly
and contemptuously cast contempt upon a flag of the United States of America
by publicly wearing [the] same as a cape" was therefore reversed."'
The Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee and others sought in-
junctive protection against possible prosecution by the Naussau County, New
York, District Attorney for distributing emblems, buttons and decals designed
as a black circle within three quadrants of which were red and white stripes,
with seven white stars on a blue field in the upper left quadrant, and upon which
was superimposed a black "peace" symbol.114 The District Court granted the
injunction holding that the New York statute"S could not be constitutionally
invoked to prosecute the wearing of the symbols since the statute was intended
to protect the flag itself from physical alteration. The statute, however, was
not held unconstitutional.1
1 6
With the accumulation of cases today wherein individuals are finding an
infinite variety of ways to act upon, reproduce or represent the flag to convey
an essentially subjective meaning, the American public looks to the Supreme
Court for an answer. The most recent statement from the Court was issued
by Justice Harlan on January 17, 1970. In dismissing the appeal of a de-
fendant's conviction for "defiling" the flag by cutting and sewing the flag
into a vest and wearing it in public, Justice Harlan stated that the issue -
"whether symbolic expression by displaying a 'mutilated' American flag [was]
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment - [was] one that [he could not]
regard as insubstantial."" 7 The Court refused to address the issue on the grounds
that the trial court had not established as a factual matter whether there was
any "recognizable communicative aspect to [the] appellant's conduct."" 8
V. Conclusion
The necessity for an answer to the unsettled issue is obvious; it is genuinely
compelling for the civil libertarian. The cries for consistency and certainty in
the interpretation and application of the law in each state are becoming louder
and more frequent throughout the nation.
Underlying all of this is the feeling that, in an age of increasing polariza-
tion of views, few have ever paused to reflect upon the latent but unassailable
thought that political viewpoint is not synonymous with patriotism or love of
country. Where a controversial issue divides the nation into majority and
minority views, it does not follow in a country professing freedom of expression
that the minority should be punished for making known its opinion through
flag symbolism (as in wearing a flag patch on the seat of trousers) any more
112 State v. Saionz, 23 Ohio App.2d 79, 82-83 (1970).
113 Id. at 79.
114 Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 39 U.S.L.W. 2015 (E.D. N.Y. June 22, 1970).
115 NEW YORK GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(a) (McKinney 1968).
116 Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 39 U.S.L.W. 2015, 2016 (E.D. N.Y. June 22,
1970).




than the majority should be rewarded for making known its opposition through
a different form of flag symbolism (as in wearing a flag patch on police uniforms).
The point is that the American flag waves above and beyond the jealous reach
of either group. It symbolizes both the minority and the majority because they
are Americans, despite the outrage either group feels toward the other from
the opinion each identifies with the flag.
Certainly our Constitution can never permit the conclusion that the expres-
sion of opinion by the peaceful "desecration" of the'flag is an "overt act against
peace and good order" based on the assumption that such an act is aimed at
weakening "the patriotic unity which is our strength." 1 9 Students and "hard-
hats," "doves" and "hawks," liberals and conservatives - all those who. enjoy
the exercise of free expression - know the consequences which would befall them
should the fear of "political censorship" felt by Chief Judge Fuld ever become
reality in this country.'2 ° Representative Mink eloquently stated this point in" her
remarks to the House upon consideration of the federal flag desecration law:
America is not a country which needs to punish its dissenters to pre-
serve its honor .... America is not a country which needs to demand con-
formity of its people, for its strength lies in all our diversities converging
in one common belief, that of the importance of freedom as the essence
of our country and the real honor and heritage of our Nation, which no
trampled flag can ever symbolically desecrate.' 2 '
In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court which uphold the protection
of symbolic speech and which emphasize the importance of free expression to
the operation of democratic government, the Court has impliedly chosen the
course it will follow. To permit physical abuse of the flag with impunity may
stir the sensibilities of many Americans. However, to limit the first amendment
by proscribing peaceful symbolism which uses the flag as its medium would
unconstitutionally restrict the exercise of the most cherished of American rights
- the freedom of expression.
Consequently, in a case such as Radich, which involves the balancing of
two interests, the Supreme Court must recognize that only one of these interests
- the preservation of free expression - carries the substantial weight of historical
precedent and the authority of the United States Constitution. The Radich con-
viction cannot stand in light of these considerations, for such a conviction would
inevitably represent the desecration of the ideals which are universally symbolized
by the flag.
Dennis M. Tushla
119 Prosser, Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. L.F. 159, 237 (1969).
120 People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 257 N.E.2d 30, 39, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 857
(1970).




This chart sets out the distinctions among the fifty state laws on flag
desecration. The focus of this comparison is only upon that section of the
statute(s) describing public acts of desecration. Most states use essentially the
same language for this legislation as, for example, in Arizona:
A person who publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles, tramples upon, or by
word or act casts contempt upon [the flag of the United States] is guilty
of ... Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-793 (c).
This wording is regarded as standard.
The distinctions in "maximum penalty" are obvious. Some states are
designated as having amended this provision, which in all such states has been
an increase in either the amount of the fine, or in the length of the sentence,
or both. A few have changed this law from a misdemeanor to a felony.
The distinctions in "particular language" are based on several comparative
elements: whether any notion of the actor's intent is required by use of the
terms "wilful," "deliberate," "intentional," or "knowing"; whether the language
is standard (stnd.) or patterned after the Uniform Flag Law (UFL); whether
the laws are currently in force or whether any provisions have been held un-
constitutional; whether any special provision is made for burning the flag; and
lastly, whether any wording sets off one statute as unique from any other.
MAXIMUM PARTICULAR
STATE STATUTE PENALTY LANGUAGE
Alabama ALA:. CODE tit. 14, 1 year and/or Burning-felony




Alaska ALASKA STAT. 1 year and/or "wilfully"
§ 11.60.220 (1962). $200.
Arizona ARiz. REV. STAT. 1 year and/or stnd.
ANN. § 41-793 (1956). $2000.
Arkansas ARK. STAT. ANN. 30 days and/or stnd.
§ 41-1701 (1964). $100.
California CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE "misdemeanor" stnd.
§ 614 (1955).
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. 30 days and/or stnd.
ANN. § 40-23-3 $100.
(1963).
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. 6 months and/or stnd. NOTE: § 53-255
ANN. § 53-255 (1958). $100. rpld-PA 828, § 214,
effective 10-1-71.
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. 30 days and/or UFL-declared uncon-
tit. 11, § 532 $100. stitutionally vague,
(1968). Hodsdon v. Buckson,
310 F. Supp. 528 (D.
Del. 1970).
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. "misdemeanor" UFL
§ 256.06 (1962).
Georgia GA. REv. CODE ANN. "misdemeanor" "deliberately"
§ 26-2803 (1968).
Hawaii HAWAII REv. LAws 30 days and/or stnd.
























LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:116 (1960).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 254 (1964).
MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27. §§ 83, 85
(1967).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.










ANN. § 94-3581 (1969).
NEB. Rav. STAT.
§ 28-1102.01 (1965).





































New Hampshire N.H. Rav. STAT. 6 months and/or stnd.
ANN. §§ 573:1, 573:3-:5 $1000 (amended).
(1967).
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. 3 years and/or stnd.
§§ 2A: 107-2, $1000.
2A:85-7 (1951).
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. "petty misde- "improper use"
§ 40A-21-4 (1964). meanor"
New York N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW "misdemeanor" stnd. NOTE: § 136 can-
§ 136 (McKinney Supp. not be constitutionally
1968). applied to prosecute
one who "casts con-
tempt by word .. "
Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969).
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. 30 days and/or stnd.
§ 14-381 (1953). $50.
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE 30 days and/or stnd.
§ 12-07-04 (1960). $5-$25.
Ohio OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 30 days-1 year stnd.

































maliciously . . ."
"defames, slanders,

















tit. 18, § 4211
(1967).






























"wilfully trail it in
the dust with intent
to dishonor . . ."
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. 1-3 years and/or "wilfully and mali-
§ 39-1607 (1967). $500-$1000. ciously . . ." Felony-
amended.
Texas Trx. REv. Civ. "forfeit penalty stnd.
STAT. art. 6139 of fifty dollars
(1962). for each offense
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 30 days and/or stnd.
§ 76-14-1 (1963). $100.
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. 1 year and/or UFL
tit. 13, §§ 1902-3 $1000.
(1958).
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. "misdemeanor" UFL
§§ 18.1-425, (amended).
18.1-427 (1968).
Washington WASH. REv. CODE ANN. "gross misde- UFL; "knowingly"
§§ 9.86.030, meanor"
9.86.050 (1969).
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. 30 days and/or stnd.
§ 61-1-8 (1966). $5-$100.
Wisconsin Wis. STAT. ANN. 1 year and/or "intentionally"
§§ 946.05-.06 $500 (amended),
(1969).
Wyoming Wyo. STAT. ANN. 1 year and/or "wilfully"
§ 6-106 (1957). $250.
.[Fall, 1970]
